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China’s Presence in Latin America
Strategies, Aims and Limits
François Lafargue
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translated by Philip Liddell
1 For its first fifty years the People’s Republic of China (PRC) took little interest in Latin
America1. The United States exercised unrivalled political and economic power in the
region, and is still the dominant influence2. While Cuba established diplomatic relations
with  China  from  1960  onwards,  most  Latin  American  governments  waited  until
President  Nixon’s  visit  to  Beijing  in  February  1972  before  recognising  the  People’s
Republic:  in 1972 Argentina and Mexico recognised the PRC, followed by Brazil  two
years later and, later still, Bolivia in 1985. This period of relative indifference was now
at an end. President Hu Jintao’s visits, towards the end of 2004, to Brazil, Argentina,
Chile and Cuba and, a year later, to Mexico attested to Beijing’s interest in the region3.
While numerous studies have focused on China’s policy towards Africa, its role in Latin
America  is  less  frequently  touched upon.  Yet,  its  growing presence  there  is  of  the
greatest economic and geostrategic significance; and raises concerns and anxieties both
in Latin America and in the United States, where Beijing’s interference in the region
has aroused something less than enthusiasm. In media and political circles, periodic
alarms  have  been  sounded  over  the  Chinese  presence  in  America’s  “back  yard”4.
Washington’s  fears  have  been  strengthened  over  the  past  year  with  the  electoral
triumphs of Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Alan García in Peru and then Lula da Silva in
Brazil, all of whom are openly seeking closer relations with Beijing.
China in Latin America: a growing influence
2 China’s influence in Latin America can be evaluated in two ways. From the outset, one
objective  consideration  must  be  noted:  so  far,  China’s  presence  is  limited.  As  a
proportion of China’s overall  trade, Latin America represents only 3.55%―a modest
total as yet5. According to Chinese government data, in 2004 less than 18% of all China’s
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Foreign  Direct  Investment  (FDI),  that  is  US$8.2  billion6 worth  was  placed  in  Latin
America. And China’s share of the incoming flow of FDI amounted to only 6%7. Yet this
data has to be treated with caution. On a careful reading of the MOFCOM statistics, it
appears that China’s investment in the region is mainly concentrated on the Cayman
Islands  and  the  Virgin  Islands,  both  of  which  are  notorious  as  tax  havens.  In  all
probability,  this capital is  sent back to mainland China for reinvestment,  qualifying
now  for  the  benefits  accorded  to  foreign  investors.  When  this  investment  in  the
Caymans and the Virgin Islands is excluded, Latin America receives no more than 1.5%
of China’s overall FDI. And a comparable figure is suggested by UNCTAD8: in 2002, China
invested US$653 million overall, 1.5% of its total outward investment. But these figures
do not  reflect  the  rapid  expansion of  financial  relations  between Beijing and Latin
America. China’s total foreign investment in 2005 is put at US$6.9 billion, bringing the
cumulative figure for its investment across the world to US$50 billion. And, since 2003,
China has  signed public  and private  investment projects  in  Latin America,  detailed
below, worth nearly ten billion dollars in all. In November 2004, in Brasilia, President
Hu  addressed  members  of  the  National  Congress  promising  that  China  would  be
investing US$100 billion in the region over the next ten years. The promise is in the
process of being fulfilled. 
3 At  the  same  time,  the  volume  of  bilateral  trade  is  increasing  exponentially,  from
US$12.6 billion in 2001 to US$40 billion in 2004, settling at over US$50 billion in 2005
(see Table 1). By 2010 the figure of US$100 billion should have been reached. China’s
main trading partners are Brazil,  Mexico and Chile, who between them represented
62.2% of all exchanges9 in 2004 (charts 1 and 2). Data provided by MOFCOM is set out in
Tables 1 and 2; it is used as reference material for the international institutions. But
most Latin American countries reject these figures, putting China’s exports to them at
lower  levels.  And  the  gap  may  be  significant.  There  is  a  simple  reason  for  this
underestimate. A large proportion (12%) of China’s exports to the region are officially
destined for Panama―rather surprisingly, considering Panama’s small population (3
million) and the fact that it does not maintain diplomatic relations with Beijing. The
truth is that Panama performs on the American continent a role comparable to that of
Hong  Kong  in  Asia  (an  area  where  industrial  products  are  assembled  and  China’s
exports are packaged) and is in reality no more than a point of transit.
4 It  is  also worth noting that Mercosur or,  in English,  the Southern Common Market
(linking Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela) allows for Chinese goods
to be circulated far from its initial destination10. China’s interest in Latin America may
be  explained  in  terms  of  three  imperatives:  oil  supplies,  minerals  and  agricultural
products.
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1. Trade between Latin America and China (US$ billion)
 
2. China’s share in Latin American countries’ trade in 2004 (US$ billion)
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3. Top five recipient countries of Chinese exports in Latin America (2004)
 
4. China’s top five suppliers in 2004
Oil supplies
5 By 2002, China had become the word’s second biggest consumer of oil, after the United
States but ahead of Japan. And between 2000 and 2005, Beijing moved up from ninth to
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third place among the world’s  oil  importers.  These foreign purchases,  representing
nearly one-third of China’s oil  consumption in 2000 and rising to one-half today, is
likely to reach 60% between now and 2010. So China has committed itself to a policy of
diversifying its supplies of hydrocarbons by investing in Africa, (Sudan and Angola in
particular), Central Asia and Latin America.
6 Latin America, with 9.7% of the world’s oil reserves, was producing by 2005 8.8% of
world output11. For the time being, China’s presence in the hydrocarbon sector remains
modest. It is, admittedly, the third largest importer of Latin American oil, but lags far
behind the United States in terms of volume12.  By 2005, the region provided 3.1% of
China’s oil supplies, 107,000 barrels per day (bpd). This may seem a small amount, but
these exports were up by 28% on the previous year (83,000 bpd) and were nearly twenty
times more than in 2001. An undeniable rise in importance is taking place, with Latin
America’s contribution to China’s oil imports estimated to have doubled last year.
7 China has established particularly close relations with Venezuela, an oil producer in
the first league. Venezuela has 6.6% of the world’s oil reserves (putting it in sixth place)
and 68% of Latin America’s reserves (as against Mexico’s 11.3%). As a producer it ranks
in seventh place, with 4% of world production. 
8 In December 2004 and again more recently in August last year, President Hugo Chávez
paid an official visit to Beijing, where he and President Hu signed several agreements
on economic and commercial co-operation. Bilateral trade between the two countries
rose from US$150 million worth in 2003 to US$1.2 billion in 2004 and US$2.14 billion in
2005. China’s Vice President, Zeng Qinghong, visited Caracas in January 2005, attesting
Beijing’s interest in Venezuela. On that occasion, several new contracts were signed.
China  plans  investments  worth  US$350  million  in  the  development  of  15  oilfields
(which  might  contain  up  to  one  billion  barrels  of  oil)  and  US$60  million  towards
infrastructure costs (building a rail network, refineries . . .). The China Petroleum and
Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) have also signed
agreements  on offshore  gas  exploration.  Then,  at  the  end of  August  2005,  the  two
countries formed a joint company to develop the Zumano oilfield in Anzoátegui State,
which promises an output of 50,000 bpd. China has also created a US$40 million credit
line for Venezuela’s purchase of agricultural equipment from China.
9 The volume of Venezuela’s oil exports to China rose between 2004 and 2005 from 12,300
bpd to 70,000 bpd. Last year it reached 160,000 bpd13, a figure likely to double over the
year  ahead,  on  course  to  reach  500,000  bpd  by  2010.  By  the  second  half  of  2006,
Venezuela was supplying about 5% of China’s oil imports. China is its second biggest
customer, after the United States, purchasing about 15% of its oil exports.
10 Yet, the volume of hydrocarbon exports remains restricted for the present: the Panama
Canal is too narrow14 for large tankers to pass through it. The other sea route, around
the Cape of Good Hope, takes twice as long (nearly 45 days) as the Pacific crossing. In
May 2006,  Beijing and Caracas signed a contract worth a total  of  US$1.3 billion for
China to supply 18 oil tankers and to provide technical aid for Venezuela to build more
tankers of its own.
11 A further difficulty worth noting is that the Venezuelan oilfields yield a crude that is
extra  heavy  (high in  sulphur);  and China’s  refineries  are  not  properly  equipped to
process it. While Venezuela is looked on as the linchpin of China’s oil strategy, Beijing
does not neglect the more modest producers such as Ecuador and Peru.
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12 Ecuador has the third largest oil reserves in South America, after Venezuela and Brazil.
It produces 11.5% of South America’s oil exports, ranking next to Venezuela with 74.2%
and its potential is significant. Ecuador has the further advantage of a coastline on the
Pacific side, which facilitates trade with Asia. In August 2003, in Ecuador, the China
National  Trading Corporation (CNPC)15 was  granted prospecting rights  by  President
Lucio Gutiérrez. A few months later, China National Chemical (SINOCHEM) bought 14%
of an oilfield (2,200 square kilometres designated as “bloc 16”) in Orellana Province
from Conoco Philipps for the sum of US$100 million. The oilfield, expected to produce
8,000 bpd for SINOCHEM, is being mainly developed by the Spanish company Repsol-
YPF (55%) and the Taiwanese company Chinese Petroleum Corporation (CPC) (31%).
13 Lastly, in September 2005, the consortium Andes Petroleum led by the CNPC bought out
the interests of  the Canadian company EnCana Corporation for US$1.4 billion―that
year’s third most significant financial transaction in Latin America. By means of this
acquisition China will have access to oil production of 75,000 bpd (thanks mainly to the
output from the Tarapoa and Shiripuno oilfields) and to reserves put at around 143
million barrels. In Peru, as early as 1993, the CNPC had acquired drilling rights in block
6 (155 square kilometres) and block 7 (184 square kilometres) of the Talara oilfield, with
reserves estimated at 22 million barrels.
14 In Brazil, where China’s investments are more limited, SINOPEC and the Brazilian firm
Petrobras  have  pledged  themselves  to  increase  their  joint  ventures  in  foreign
countries, such as Iran. In Argentina, during President Hu’s visit in 2004, he promised
to invest US$20 billion over ten years, of which a quarter would go into the oil industry.
Energía  Argentina  and a  Sino-Angolan company (China  Sonangol  International)  are
jointly engaged in offshore exploration in waters off Argentina.
15 In 2004, the CNPC bought out the subsidiary of Grupo Pluspetrol in Peru, Pluspetrol
Norte16 for a total of US$200 million. Then in Cuba in March 2005, SINOPEC concluded a
deal with Cubapetróleo (CUPET) in order to develop the Pinar del Río oilfield on the
west coast of the island. Similarly, Mexico has not avoided China’s envious attention,
even  though  it  is  a  member  of  the  NAFTA  Secretariat.  The  visits  there  by  Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao in December 2003 and by President Hu in September 2005 led to
the signing of oil contracts. So far, Mexico is not exporting any hydrocarbons to China,
but the CNPC has obtained exploration permits.
16 Beijing’s presence in Bolivia is still modest; but this country, with its significant gas
reserves17, could also in the long run become an important supplier. The triumph in the
2005 presidential election of Evo Morales, a harsh critic of the United States, might
seem to favour a rapprochement with China. In January 2006, Morales undertook a ten-
day foreign tour, taking in Cuba, Venezuela, Spain, France, China, South Africa and,
finally, Brazil. While he was in Beijing, he met President Hu and pressed China to come
and invest in Bolivia. Above all, the decision last May to nationalise the assets of foreign
hydrocarbon producers (such as Repsol, and Total―but also the Brazilian Petrobras)
will deprive the country of investment in this sector and oblige it to seek new partners.
This is because these enterprises must now agree to sign new and much less generous
contracts or else leave the country.
A mining interest
17 Latin America has 45% of the world’s copper reserves, a quarter of its silver reserves
and a third of its pewter reserves: for China it represents an invaluable source of raw
materials to draw upon. Chile and Peru between them produce 44% of world copper
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output  and  for  China,  the  world’s  biggest  consumer,  half  its  imports.  It  is  hardly
surprising that China is building up its investments in the mining sector. Its giant steel-
maker, Shougang Group, via its subsidiary Shougang Hierro Peru, has since 1992 been
working several Peruvian iron ore mines, including the one at Marcona to the south of
Lima.
18 In Chile, in June 2005, the Chinese company Minmetals Corporation joined forces with
Codelco (Corporación Nacional del Cobre)18 to secure annual deliveries of 55,000 tons of
copper for 15 years. China may also take a share in developing the Gaby copper mine
with its expected yearly production (from 2008 onwards) of 150,000 tons.
19 Among Cuba’s trading partners, China now ranks third after Spain and Venezuela. The
relationship  is  being  extended.  The  island  is  the  world’s  third  largest  producer  of
nickel19 and has significant reserves of copper and cobalt. In November 2004, on the
occasion of President Hu’s visit to Havana, Minmetals and Cubaniquel agreed jointly to
develop the nickel deposits at Las Camariocas in Holguín Province, 800 kilometres east
of Havana: production has reached 22,500 tons a year. This collaboration is expected to
push Cuba’s annual copper production, currently 75,000 tons, up to nearly 132,000 tons.
A further deal has been signed between the China International Trust and Investment
Corporation  (CITIC)  and  Cubaniquel  to  develop  the  nickel  deposit  at  San  Felipe  in
Camaguey Province. Chinese investments look likely to swell still further in the years
ahead.  On  September  9th  2005,  a  colloquium  was  held  in  Xiamen  on  China’s
opportunities  for  investment  in  Cuba.  The  Cuban  delegation  proposed  12  projects
including building sugar houses and tourist infrastructure.
20 Brazil is also one of the main targets for Chinese investment. After India and Australia,
Brazil ranks as China’s third biggest supplier of iron ore, providing a quarter of all its
imports. In five years, 2000-2005, China moved up from fifteenth place among Brazil’s
trading partners to being its third biggest customer. In October 2001, the Brazilian firm
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD), the world’s leading producer and exporter of iron
ore, undertook to deliver six million tons of ore per year to the steel-maker Baosteel,
China’s  leading producer.  From 2010  onwards  the  annual  order  will  increase  to  20
million tons. In spring 2004, Baosteel, CVRD and Arcelor decided jointly to build a steel-
making complex in Brazil, near the port of São Luis in Maranhao state. The plant is
designed to produce 3.7 million tons of steel plate per year, from 2007 onwards. It is no
further than a day’s journey by rail from the mine at Carajas and a few days by sea from
Panama. The total investment came to US$2.5 billion, of which Baosteel put up 60%.
CRVD has  also  concluded agreements  with  Shougang to  deliver  iron ore.  But  Latin
America represents not just a source of raw materials, but an agricultural storehouse
too.
An agricultural interest
21  In China, the damage wrought in some regions by industrialisation and poor irrigation
has  diminished  the  available  farmland  and  progressively  reduced  national  farm
production. Thus, the soya crop, 17 million tons in 2005, was no bigger than it had been
ten years before. Today, China is the world’s leading consumer and importer of soya
(38% of  world imports).  Half  of  its  soya consumption is  imported,  mainly from the
United States, Brazil and Argentina, the world’s three biggest exporters20. Argentina by
itself provides a third of China’s soya imports. Between 1999 and 2004, the value of
Chinese  imports  of  soya  from  Brazil  and  Argentina  increased  ten  times  over.
Improvements in living standards also led to an increase in meat consumption: per
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person, it has doubled since 1990. The meat was bought in large measure from Brazil
and Argentina, which provide between them 20% of Beijing’s meat imports.
Concerns over the Chinese presence
22 China’s presence has upset the economic and geostrategic balance in the region. These
massive  investments  have  provoked  a  real  debate21 across  Latin  America,  where
governments fear their countries may be confined to the role of providing agricultural
and mineral raw materials. The figures speak volumes: three quarters of Argentina’s
exports to China consist of agricultural products. China is the main customer for soya
beans, buying 45% of the total exported; Thailand comes next with 13% and Spain with
7%.  And  when  it  comes  to  Brazil’s  exports  to  China,  37%  consist  of  agricultural
products. The dependence of the Latin American countries is undeniable. China is the
destination for 70% of the iron ore, 47% of the lead and 37% of the copper exported by
Peru, 33% of the pewter exported by Bolivia and 16% of the copper leaving Chile. Far
from allowing development, trade with China tends over the long term to weaken the
Latin American economies. China reinforces the rentier attitude in these countries. The
appreciating prices for raw materials22 and the growth rates in Chile (5.9% in 2004 and
then 5.1% in 2005) or Argentina (9.2% in 2005) do little to encourage people to diversify
their production. The opening up of trade is the root of many disappointments. Imports
from China  swamp the  local  markets,  a  situation  that  might  be  aggravated  by  the
creation of a bilateral free-trade area. The sometimes unfair competition from Chinese
goods  has  also  been denounced.  In  2005,  several  governments  including Brazil  and
Argentina23 did  not  hesitate  to  employ  anti-dumping measures  against  textiles  and
toys.  Beijing’s  trading deficit  with Latin America is  fairly  quickly  absorbed.  Brazil’s
trading surplus with China has been considerably reduced, falling from US$5 billion in
2004  to  US$1.48  billion  the  following  year.  On  top  of  everything,  Latin  American
countries  are  up  against  Chinese  competition  in  foreign  markets,  especially  in  the
United States. Between 2003 and 2005, with the end of the Multifibre Agreement (MFA),
China’s share in US textile imports doubled, increasing from 25% to 56%.
23 It  is  also  worth  noting  that  recriminations  against  Chinese  investors  and  their
management  methods  are  rising  sharply.  Brazilian  workers  at  the  Gree  Electric
Appliances factory, a Chinese investment in Manaus, complain of excessive production
rates and insensitivity to social etiquette. There are many such examples. 
24 Even so, a study by the Inter-American Development Bank24 sets out to be reassuring: it
considers  that  Latin American  economies  are  not  endangered  by  direct  Asian
competition.  Quite  the  contrary:  China  appears  to  offer  a  potential  export  market,
especially  for  Brazil.  Moreover,  China  is  the  target  for  a  third  of  Brazil’s  foreign
investments,  including  those  by  Brasmotor  and  Embraco  Snowflake,  producers  of
domestic  appliances,  and  by Sabó  and Marcopolo,  makers  of  cars  and  buses
respectively. The Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer has also embarked on a joint
venture with China Aviation Industry Corporation, to produce in Harbin the ERJ 145
regional transport aircraft.
25 Thus, it may be an exaggeration to see in these Chinese investments only the behaviour
of an economic predator, as the United States frequently asserts. As evidence of this
bilateral rapprochement, in November 2004, Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Chile awarded
to China the status of market economy, a recognition still withheld by the United States
and  the  European  Union.  Beijing  is  asking  its  main  trading  partners  to  make  this
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acknowledgement,  in  order  to  defend  itself  against  anti-dumping  proceedings  that
governments may bring against it25.
Washington’s distrust
26 In the United States, most reports and assessments devoted to China’s presence in Latin
America come to the same conclusion. Beijing is a real threat26, in three areas, political,
diplomatic and military.
Latin America without the United States? 
27 Within a few years, following the elections of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela (1998) and Lula
Da Silva in Brazil (2002), most Latin American countries elected governments of the
populist left,  with mostly hostile attitudes to American policy;  their leaders include
Nestor Kirchner in Argentina (2003), Tabaré Vasquez in Uruguay (2004), Evo Morales in
Bolivia (2005) and Michelle Bachelet in Chile (2005). In particular, the victory of Daniel
Ortega in Nicaragua last November perplexes the United States, which dreads even the
thought of any lessening of its influence in the Latin American continent. US fears are
all the more justified because, since September 11th 2001, the United States has paid
scant attention to Latin America. On the political front, China’s presence erodes the
influence  of  Washington,  whose  growing  isolation  is  evident.  Only  Nicaragua,
Honduras, the Dominican Republic and Salvador joined the United States-led coalition
to fight in Iraq27. Latin American countries are no longer afraid to defy Washington; and
they see in China a more conciliatory partner than the IMF. The point is illustrated by
Bolivia’s decision to follow Ecuador’s example in nationalising its hydrocarbon sector.
China will be taking over the American and European investments.
28 On the oil front, Latin America provides more than a quarter of US imports28; but they
have  had  to  reduce  their  purchases  from  Venezuela  because  of  President  Chávez’
policies. Relations between Caracas and Washington are on the slide. Chávez is seeking
to  create  a  common  front  against  what  he  calls  North  American  imperialism.  His
rhetoric is reflected in closer relations with governments condemned by Washington,
such as Belarus and Iran.
29 China, being a major investor, may enable Venezuela to rid itself of US influence29. But
Chávez looks well beyond the function of supplying hydrocarbons. He sees a political
role  for  himself  on  the  international  stage.  In  October  2006,  Venezuela  made  a
bid―with China’s support―for one of the non-permanent seats on the UN Security
Council―in vain, however. Venezuela fought a bitter battle with Guatemala (which had
support from Washington)―and Panama won the election.
30 And China will probably be asked to deliver arms to Caracas, following in the footsteps
of Spain (due to supply transport aircraft and corvettes) and Russia (Sukhoi fighter
planes). Chávez’ self-confidence has been rewarded by the links forged with China. His
project,  the “Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas” is  designed to strengthen co-
operation between economies  in  the  region.  In  June  2005,  Venezuela  concluded an
alliance known as Petrocaribe30 with 13 Caribbean states, enabling it to support socialist
municipalities in Salvador and Nicaragua31 and to contribute to the popularity of left-
wing movements. Similarly, Cuba has achieved oil independence thanks partly to its
own production (which covers half the island’s needs), and partly to deliveries from
Venezuela. Meanwhile, the region’s two other powers, Mexico and Brazil, are the focus
for real attention from Beijing.
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31 In  2001,  the  Sinatex  textile  company,  a  subsidiary  of  China  Worldbest  Group,  was
established in Obregón in Mexico. This is China’s most significant investment in the
country to date. Bilateral trade, still limited, is growing fast. By 2004, the volume of
commercial exchanges had risen to US$7.112 billion, 44% up on the previous year. The
political closeness between Mexico and Washington, and the ban on foreign enterprises
investing in the oil sector, have the effect of discouraging joint projects, at least for the
present.
32 With Brazil, China has formed a real partnership since 1986 in the space sector. The two
countries have pushed ahead with the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS)
programme. The highlight of this joint venture was the launch in October 1999 of the
CBERS  satellite  (known  in  China  as  Zong  guo  Zi  Yuan)  designed  to  collect
meteorological information. In October 2003, China went ahead with the launch of a
second  satellite  (Zi-Yuan-2),  the  technical  specifications  of  which  have  not  been
disclosed. The launches of two new satellites, CBERS-3 and 4 are planned for 2008 and
2010.  This Sino-Brazilian collaboration extends to the energy field,  with Brazil  now
planning to supply China with uranium to fuel its nuclear power stations.
33 Lastly, Beijing’s presence in the region seriously compromises the plan for a Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA) promoted by President Bush. In November 2006, at the
Mar del Plata summit, the 34 participants were unable to reach any agreement. Latin-
American governments considered Washington’s concessions too meagre. For its part,
Beijing  is  proposing  to  conclude  preferential  trade  agreements.  In  November  2005,
China and Chile signed a first bilateral free trade treaty, designed to be extended in due
course to the other countries in the region. Already 92% of Chile’s exports to China are
exempt from customs duties.
Diplomatic issues 
34 China’s peaceful ascendancy in Latin America may induce some governments to break
with Taiwan, thus intensifying the island’s isolation. Among the 25 states that maintain
diplomatic relations with Taiwan, nearly half are in Latin America and the Caribbean:
Belize,  Costa  Rica,  Guatemala,  Haiti,  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Paraguay,  the
Dominican  Republic,  Saint  Kitts  and  Nevis,  Saint  Vincent  and  the  Grenadines,  and
Salvador. Taiwan could lose the support of a close ally since Daniel Ortega won last
November’s  election  in  Nicaragua.  The  United  States  is  also  concerned  by  China’s
growing military influence.
A contested military role
35 For the present, admittedly, military co-operation is still limited32; but there is every
indication that Beijing will not reject the approaches of some countries in the region.
Bolivia,  like  Peru,  is  one of  the few Latin American customers for  Chinese military
hardware. Military co-operation between La Paz and Beijing began as far back as the
1980s. In 1993, China delivered to the Bolivian government 28 surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs) in respect of a bilateral co-operation agreement. In October 2005, anticipating
Evo Morales’ victory, American military advisers working in complicity with Bolivian
army commanders succeeded in moving the missiles to the El Alto airbase near La Paz
and then flew them to the United States33.
36 Cuba  allows  China  to  use  the  telecommunications  installations  built―and  later
abandoned―by the Russians, including the Lourdes spy base at Torrens near Havana,
which houses some sophisticated equipment. The base was built in 1964 and up until
2001  was  home  to  over  a  thousand  Russian  technicians.  In  strengthening  Chinese
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influence (reflected in exchanges of military missions), Beijing is taking advantage of
Washington’s relative self-effacement, which has intensified since the creation of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) governed by the Rome Statute. The United States
does  not  recognise  the  competence  of  the  Court34:  it  adopted  in  August  2002  the
American Service Members Protection Act, which blocks any military co-operation with
states that  recognise the ICC’s  status.  So far,  with the exception of  Chile,  Salvador,
Guatemala and Nicaragua, all Latin American governments have signed and ratified the
Rome Statute. In response, the United States demanded that its personnel should be
granted  immunity  from  the  Court’s  proceedings35 by  means  of  Bilateral  Immunity
Agreements  (BIAs)―but  in  vain.  To  persuade  the  most  reluctant,  the  Nethercutt
amendment, voted through in December 2004, provided for financial sanctions against
ICC member states refusing to sign the BIAs. After Colombia, Bolivia too was forced in
May  2005  to  submit  to  a  bilateral  agreement.  It  is  understood  that  Honduras  and
Panama  have  also  signed  confidential  deals  with  Washington.  Reporting  to  the  US
Senate, General Bantz J Craddock36 declared that it was dangerous to suspend military
co-operation  with  most  Latin  American  countries,  those  which  have  rejected  the
principle of  allowing immunity to the United States.  He said the United States was
denying  itself  the  opportunity  of  providing  military  training  for  countries  in  the
region.
37 So Washington considers China’s presence as disadvantageous. The sharp increase in
bilateral trade is reflected in a worrying rise in criminal activity (such as smuggling and
counterfeiting).  Beijing’s  attitude,  in  lending  support  to  populist  and  demagogic
political parties, is a destabilising influence on the American continent.
38 Yet,  it  would be wrong to conclude that  Latin America was coming under Beijing’s
influence or that such influence was all-powerful. Electoral changes in Latin America
owe  more  to  the  development  of  Latin  American  societies  (a  financial  crisis  in
Argentina, the rejection of the multinationals, the emancipation of Indian majorities,
the  final  stages  in  the  process  of  democratisation)  than  to  any  particular  Chinese
influence  or  strategy.  Instability and  political  changes  are  also  weakening  Chinese
enterprises, as in Bolivia and still more recently in Ecuador.
39 In  September  2004,  two  Chinese  enterprises,  Lutianhua  and  Chengda  Chemical
announced their joint venture with the Bolivian firm LisaTum to build a petrochemical
plant designed to produce ammonia. Three months later, in December, a subsidiary of
SINOPEC, Shengli Oilfield, signed several contracts with YPFB37, the Bolivian state oil
company; their projects included two refineries, a power station near Villamontes, ten
oilfields in the Chaco and the Chapare region. The agreement had been made possible
when China accepted a minority stake with 49% of the shared enterprise: this would
have been a colossal investment38, amounting to US$1.5 billion, the equivalent of 18% of
Bolivia’s  GNP  in  2004.  However,  the  legal  minefield  surrounding  investments  in
Bolivia’s hydrocarbon sector eventually prompted Shengli to pull out of the project.
40 China has also become embroiled in legal difficulties in Ecuador. In May 2006, the state
oil company revoked the operating contracts awarded the US oil company, Occidental
Petroleum. Oxy, as it is known, was accused of having illegally transferred, six years
before, a 40% interest in its fields to the Canadian group EnCana. EnCana, however, had
then  passed  these  holdings  on  to  the  Chinese  consortium,  the  Andes  Petroleum
Company, which now finds itself having to contest ownership.
Conclusion
China’s Presence in Latin America
China Perspectives, 68 | november- december 2006
11
41 In Latin America, China finds itself adapting to an environment less familiar than that
which it previously found in Africa39. Ever since the 1950s, China has been forging its
links  with  black  Africa  and  has  helped  some  of  its  peoples  in  their struggles  for
freedom. With Latin America,  shared memories are fewer and friendships are quite
recent. The Chinese political system arouses distrust in a region that has its own tragic
experience of dictatorships, a region where democratic institutions are still fragile. The
relationship between Beijing and Latin America is  not one of subjection. Brazil,  the
world’s tenth-ranking economic power (its GDP is twice that of sub-Saharan Africa)
sees itself more as China’s partner than as its henchman.
42 Looking beyond the fine words in praise of friendship and cooperation, one can detect a
hint of mistrust. In 2004, Beijing joined the Organisation of American States (OAS) with
the status  of  permanent  observer;  but  its  application for  membership of  the Inter-
American Development Bank has so far been rejected several times over. There is a fear
that, within that body, Beijing might weigh still more heavily on the economies and the
governments of the region.
43 China does not hesitate to sacrifice its friendships when its fundamental interests are at
stake. Beijing refused to support Brazil’s claim to a UN Security Council seat, though
Brazil is one of the original Group of Four (with Germany, India and Japan) proposed
for  permanent  membership.  The  plan  is  for  enlarging  the  Council  from  15  to  25
members, six of the seats permanent, of which two would be for the African continent
and four for non-permanent members.  No decisions have been reached.  Within the
World Trade Organisation (WTO), China is very far from being supportive to the Latin
American countries in their battles against the agricultural subsidies paid by the EU
and the United States to their producers. Beijing is not affected by this question and is
reluctant to add any extra source of grievance to its trading relations, already stormy,
with  the  West.  Yet,  Beijing  will  not  be  able  to  maintain  its  stance  of  cautious
commitment, with the growing involvement of India in Latin America, for long. Delhi is
seeking new sources of raw materials and political support in its bid for a Security
Council seat: it too is taking an interest in Latin America. 
44 For the present,  Latin America amounts to only 2.2% of India’s foreign trade40.  Yet,
these  figures  should  not  be  allowed  to  mask  the  real  dynamic  for  growth  or  the
acceleration in trade exchanges over the past few years41. These bilateral exchanges
have increased since January 2004 when India and the members of Mercosur42 signed a
preferential trade agreement on 450 products, intended over the long term to create a
Free  Trade Area.  Indian investments  in  the  region are  still  limited,  as  noted in  an
UNCTAD report.43 In 2004, India’s overall FDI amounted to US$6.6 billion, of which only
2%  was  in  Latin  America.  But,  over  the  past  three  years,  the  presence  of  Indian
enterprises in Latin America has been built up. Quite soon, Latin America will become a
fiercely  contested  market.  And  the  three  leading  powers  of  the  mid  twenty-first
century will confront one another there.
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NOTES
1. In this article, Latin America includes South America, Central America, Mexico and
the Caribbean.
2. The United States is still the leading investor in Latin America, being the main
customer and among the main suppliers of most countries in the region (it is the main
customer of Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico . . .) But these countries’ individual
share in US trade is still small, apart from that of Mexico, which takes 13% of US
exports. Brazil represents 1.1% of US trade. The total amount of trade between the
United States and Latin America (worth US$445 billion in 2004, and then US$461 billion
in 2005) is ten times the exchanges between China and Latin America.
3. In April 2001, Jiang Zemin made an extensive tour of the area, visiting Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Uruguay and Venezuela.
4. Cf. Peter Hakim, “Is Washington Losing Latin America?”, Foreign Affairs, January-
February 2006.
5. Sources: Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM) and the
United Nations: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/databases.htm
6. This figure is given by MOFCOM and cited in William Hess’s study, “Going Outside,
Round-Tripping and Dollar Diplomacy, An Introduction to Chinese Outward Direct
Investment”, Global Insight, January 2006.
7. In 2005, Latin America received US$68 billion worth of investment, as against US$61
billion the previous year.
8. UNCTAD report: “China: an emerging FDI outward investor”, December 4th 2003
9. By 2005, China was the second largest trading partner of Chile and Peru and Brazil’s
third largest. Beijing was set to become Brazil’s second largest trading partner by the
second half of 2006.
10. Smuggling is an equally flourishing activity in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) where
Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil meet. On this subject, cf. François Lafargue, “Stratégies
pétrolières chinoises en Amérique latine”, Défense nationale, January 2006, pp. 84-93.
11. Source: “BP Statistical Review of World Energy”, 2006.
12. In 2005, China bought 1.9% of the oil exported from Latin America, while the United
States took 81% and the EU 9.2%.
13. As reported by the Associated Press, July 18th 2006.
14. Several plans for widening the canal are under consideration, but they are up
against financing problems.
15. The CNPC is the second largest of China’s national oil companies, ranked after
SINOPEC (China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation) and ahead of CNOOC (China
National Offshore Oil Corporation).
16. Pluspetrol is an Argentinian company, but its majority shareholder is the Spanish
firm Repsol YPF. 
17. Bolivia has the second largest proven reserves of gas in Latin America, after
Venezuela.
18. Codelco produces 12% of the world’s output of copper.
19. Nickel accounted for 36% of Cuba’s exports in 2003. 
20. Brazil is the world’s second biggest producer of soya (35% of world production),
after the United States and ahead of Argentina.
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21. The Economist, “China and Latin America, Magic, or Realism?”, No. 8407, January
2005. The Inter-American Development Bank, in many reports, stresses the threat
represented by China. http://www.iadb.org/
22. Between November 2001 and May 2006, the price of a ton of copper on the London
spot market rose by nearly seven times.
23. Matt Moffett, Geraldo Samor, “Brazil Regrets its China Affair” The Wall Street Journal,
October 12th 2005.
24. Inter-American Development Bank, “The Emergence of China, Opportunities and
Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean”, March 2005.
25. China is denied the status of market economy by the EU and the United States
because of its impenetrable financial and banking system and the interference of the
state in the economy.
26. US Senate report “China’s role in Latin America” 2005; or again, Evans Ellis, “ US
national security implication of Chinese involvement in Latin America”, Strategic
Studies Institute, 2005.
27. By the start of this year, only Salvador still had troops in Iraq (nearly 400 men).
28. In 2005, the United States imported 12% of its oil from Mexico, 11% from Venezuela
and 3% from Brazil, Colombia and Argentina. At present, the United States buys 60% of
Venezuela’s oil exports.
29. At present, the United States buys 60% of Venezuela’s oil exports.
30. In 2005, the United States imported 12% of its oil from Mexico, 11% from Venezuela
and 3% from Brazil, Colombia and Argentina. The alliance provides for Venezuela to
supply oil at preferential rates, so as to diminish US influence over economies in the
region.
31. In April 2006, a deal was signed between Venezuela and several Nicaraguan
municipalities led by the Sandinistas. It provided for the supply of 10 million barrels
per year at market prices, 60% of the payments being made within three months and
the rest over 25 years. Of Salvador’s municipalities, 16, controlled by the Farabundo
Martí National Liberation Front, have signed a similar agreement for Venezuelan oil
supplies.
32. The armies of Latin America are mainly equipped with American and French
hardware.
33. Martin Arostegui, “Removal of missiles roils U.S.-Bolivia ties”, Washington Times,
December 22nd 2005.
34. Bill Gertz, “China Military Trains in West”, Washington Times, March 15th 2006.
35. These Immunity Agreements prohibit the surrender to the ICC of any US military
personnel, diplomats, members of the government or public officials.
36. Report to the US Senate, “China’s Role in Latin America”, September 2005.
37. Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos. 
38. For 2004, foreign direct investment in Bolivia amounted to US$134 million.
39. Cf François Lafargue, “La Chine, une Puissance africaine”, Perspectives Chinoises, 2005,
pp 2-10; and Etats-Unis, Inde, Chine, “Kriegspiel pétrolier en Afrique”, Politique
internationale, n°112, 2006, pp 402-422.
40. Latin America receives 2.7% of India’s exports (half going to Brazil and Mexico) and
supplies 1.8% of its imports. Source: Indian Department of Commerce http://
commerce.nic.in/
41. Since 2000, trade between India and Latin America has increased by two and a half
times.
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42. Since 1991, Mercosur or, in English, the Southern Common Market, brings together
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and, since December 2005, Venezuela.
43. According to the UNCTAD report “India’s outward FDI, a Giant Awakening?”, 2004.
ABSTRACTS
For half a century, the People’s Republic of China took only limited note of Latin America, a
region over which the United States exercised real political and economic hegemony. This period
of indifference is today at an end. For five years now, China has been extending its investments
from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego, and is now a leading partner of Brazil, Argentina and
Chile.  Yet,  this new presence is raising doubts and anxiety both in Latin America and in the
United States, which is less than enthusiastic about China’s involvement in the region. China has
also run up against the ambitions of India, equally concerned about supplies of raw materials.
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